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Abstract—Consider a sender, Alice, who wants to transmit pri-
vate messages to two receivers, Bob and Calvin, using unreliable
wireless broadcast transmissions and short public feedback from
Bob and Calvin. In [1], we assumed that Bob and Calvin provide
honest feedback, and characterized the secure capacity region of
the private messages under the requirement that Bob and Calvin
do not learn each other’s message. In this paper, we assume
that Bob (or Calvin) may provide dishonest feedback; or even
control the input message distributions, as is commonly assumed
in cryptography literature. We characterize the capacity region
in the case of dishonest adversaries, as well as an achievable
region for the case when the adversary has complete control on
the distribution of the messages. We also design polynomial time
protocols for both cases, that rely on the use of coding techniques
to mix and secure the private messages. As a side result, we
define an extended notion of semantic security for this problem
and using a similar approach to [2], we show the equivalence of
different security notions.
I. INTRODUCTION
A promising application of network coding in wireless is
when a wireless access point, Alice, wants to send private
messages to two receivers, Bob and Calvin, who can send
back to Alice packet acknowledgments. It is well known
in the network coding literature that to achieve the optimal
communication rates, Bob and Calvin should try to overhear
the packets intended for the other user, while Alice should
code across the private packets she has for Calvin and Bob
[3], [4]. However, this rate-optimal scheme seems to come
with a security compromise, since Bob and Calvin learn parts
of each other’s message.
In our work, we are interested in security guarantees we can
provide in this setting. As a first step, in [1] we assumed that
Calvin and Bob send honest acknowledgments, that correctly
report what are the packets they have received, and we char-
acterized what is the capacity region of secure communication
in such a broadcast setting. That is, we assumed that Bob (or
Calvin) is curious, but still honest – which is an optimistic
assumption. In this paper, we look at the more realistic setting
where Bob (or Calvin) are no longer honest, and try to deceive
Alice on what are the packets he correctly received. Moreover,
following security definitions in the cryptography literature,
we also look at the case where Bob (or Calvin) may even
control the input message distributions that Alice sends.
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For the case of a dishonest user, we provide a com-
plete capacity characterization, as well as a polynomial time
achievability algorithm that leverages coding techniques. Our
achievability protocol uses coding and feedback to exploit
three aspects of wireless: (i) Alice can broadcast; (ii) Bob and
Calvin will not receive exactly the same broadcast packets
due to channel errors and (iii) each of them passively collects
information about the other’s (encrypted) message. Clearly,
if a user dishonestly reports what are the messages he has
correctly received, we cannot offer guarantee on the message
rates he will experience; our guarantees are for the honest
receiver. Interestingly, we find that the achievable rate of
secure communication to the honest receiver is not affected
by the dishonest acknowledging of the other receiver.
We also define a stronger notion of security and design a
scheme that is secure independently of the joint distribution
of the messages, i.e., the adversary might even choose this
distribution arbitrarily. Building on the approach of [2] we
show equivalence of our security definitions with other notions
of security that are used more commonly in the realm of
cryptography.
Related work: Secure transmission of messages using noisy
channel properties was pioneered by Wyner [5], who charac-
terized the secret message capacity of wiretap channels. This
led to a long sequence of research on information-theoretic
security on various generalizations of the wiretap channel [6],
[7]. Notably, when the eavesdropper and legitimate channel
are statistically identical, then the wiretap framework yields no
security. The fact that feedback can give security even in this
case was first observed for secret key agreement by Maurer [8]
and further developed by Ahlswede-Csiszár [9] – but secure
key agreement is not the same as secure transmission of
specific messages. The wiretap channel with secure feedback
and its variants for message security have been studied in [10],
[11]. The use of feedback and broadcast for private message
transmission, without security requirements has been studied
in [3], [4].
Closest to the current work are [12] and [1]. In [12] the
secret message capacity of a single receiver broadcast channel
against a passive eavesdropper was established. As mentioned
earlier, [1] investigates a similar setting but with a much more
restrictive adversary model.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a three party communication setting with one
sender (Alice) and two receivers (Bob and Calvin). The goal
of Alice is to securely send private messages W1 and W2 to
Bob and Calvin, such that the receivers may not learn each
other’s messages.
Alice employs a memoryless erasure broadcast channel
defined as follows. The inputs of the channel are length L
vectors over Fq, which we call sometimes packets. The ith
input is denoted by Xi. The ith output of the channel seen
by Bob is Y1,i, while the output seen by Calvin is Y2,i.
The broadcast channel consists of two independent erasure
channels towards Bob and Calvin. We note that our assumption
on independence eases presentation, but it is not crucial in
deriving our results. We denote δ1 the erasure probability of
Bob’s channel and δ2 that of Calvin’s channel. More precisely,
Pr{Y1,i, Y2,i|Xi} = Pr{Y1,i|Xi}Pr{Y2,i|Xi},
Pr{Yk,i|Xi} =
{
1− δk, Yk,i = Xi
δk, Yi =⊥,
, k ∈ {1, 2}
where ⊥ is the symbol of an erasure.
Assumptions: We assume that the receivers send public
acknowledgments after each transmission stating whether or
not they received the transmission correctly. By public we
mean that the acknowledgments are available not only for
Alice but for the other receiver as well.
We assume that some authentication method prevents the
receivers from forging each other’s acknowledgments. Also,
we assume that both Bob and Calvin only know each other’s
acknowledgments causally, after they have revealed their own.
Let Si denote the state of the channel in the ith trans-
mission, Si ∈ {B,C,BC, ∅} corresponding to the receptions
“Bob only”, “Calvin only”, “Both” and “None”, respectively.
Further, S∗i denotes the state based on the acknowledgments
sent by Bob and Calvin. If both users report honestly, then
Si = S
∗
i . We denote as S
i the vector that collects all the states
up to the ith, i.e., Si = [S1 . . . Si], and similarly for S
∗i.
Beside the communication capability as described above, all
users can securely generate private randomness. We denote by
ΘA,ΘB and ΘC the private random strings Alice, Bob, and
Calvin, respectively have access to. All parties have perfect
knowledge of the communication model.
A. Security and reliability requirements
An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme sends N1 packets of length L to
Bob and N2 to Calvin using n transmissions from Alice with
error probability smaller than ǫ. Formally:
Definition 1. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme for the two user
message transmission problem consists of the following com-
ponents: (a) message alphabetsW1 = FLN1q andW2 = F
LN2
q ,
(b) encoding maps fi(.), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and (c) decoding
maps φ1(.) and φ2(.), such that if the inputs to the channel
are
Xi = fi(W1,W2,ΘA, S
∗i−1), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (1)
where W1 ∈ W1 and W2 ∈ W2 are arbitrary messages in
their respective alphabets and ΘA is the private randomness
Alice has access to, then, provided the receivers acknowledge
honestly, their estimates after decoding Wˆ1 = φ1(Y
n
1 ) and
Wˆ2 = φ2(Y
n
2 ) satisfy
Pr{Wˆ1 6=W1} < ǫ, and (2)
Pr{Wˆ2 6=W2} < ǫ. (3)
Dishonest user: We will say that a user is dishonest if the
user can (a) select the marginal distribution of the other user’s
message arbitrarily; his own message is assumed to be inde-
pendent of the other user’s message and uniformly distributed
over its alphabet and the dishonest user does not have (a
priori) access to his own message, and (b) produce dishonest
acknowledgments as a (potentially randomized) function of
all the information he has access to when producing each
acknowledgment (this includes all the packets and the pattern
of erasures he received up to and including the current packet
he is acknowledging and the acknowledgments sent by the
other user over the public channel up to the previous packet).
In the following σ denotes the dishonest user’s acknowledging
strategy.
Note that at most one of the receivers can be dishonest.
Indeed, if a user is dishonest, we cannot guarantee that his
private messages will remain secure from the other user; thus
if both users are dishonest the problem is not meaningful.
It is common to define the advantage of the adversary (in
our case a dishonest user), which measures the gain that the
adversary obtains by observing a protocol. We express the
adversarial advantage Advmis in terms of mutual information
(mis = mutual information security). We discuss the relation
between different security definitions in Section II-B.
Definition 2. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme is said to be secure
against a dishonest user, if it guarantees decodability and
security for an honest user even if the other user is dishonest
(as defined above). That is, if Bob is honest, then (2) and
Adv
mis = max
PW1 ,σ
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘC) < ǫ (4)
are satisfied, and if Calvin is honest, then (3) and
Adv
mis = max
PW2 ,σ
I(W2;Y
n
1 S
nΘB) < ǫ. (5)
are satisfied. The maxima are taken over all adversarial
acknowledging strategies and all possible distributions PW1
or PW2 of the corresponding message.
The secret message capacity region R ⊂ R2+ is the set of
all rate pairs (R1, R2), such that for every ǫ, ǫ
′ > 0 there are
N1 and N2 and a large enough n for which there exists an
(n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme that is secure against a dishonest user
and
R1 − ǫ
′ <
1
n
N1L log q, R2 − ǫ
′ <
1
n
N2L log q. (6)
Clearly a scheme which is secure against a dishonest user
is also secure against honest (but curious) users since the
dishonest user may choose to acknowledge truthfully.
When defining security against a dishonest user (Defini-
tion 2), we assumed that the dishonest user cannot control
his own message distribution. Relaxing this assumption leads
to a stronger notion of security. We define the adversarial
advantage Advmisdis (dis = distribution independent security)
for this case.
Definition 3. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme is said to provide
distribution independent security, if it guarantees decodability
and security for the honestly acknowledging user (or users)
independently of the joint distribution PW1,W2 of (W1,W2).
That is, if Bob is honest, (2) and
Adv
mis
dis = max
PW1,W2 ,σ
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘC |W2) < ǫ (7)
are satisfied, and if Calvin is honest, then (3) and
Adv
mis
dis = max
PW1,W2 ,σ
I(W2;Y
n
1 S
nΘB|W1) < ǫ. (8)
are satisfied.
A rate pair (R1, R2) belongs to the rate region Rdis if for
every ǫ, ǫ′ > 0 there are N1 and N2 and a large enough n
for which there exists an (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme that provides
distribution independent security and
R1 − ǫ
′ <
1
n
N1L log q, R2 − ǫ
′ <
1
n
N2L log q. (9)
B. Security notions
We formulate our results in information theoretic terms,
defining secrecy as a mutual information term being negligibly
small. In the realm of cryptography it is more common to
prove security of an encryption scheme by showing dis-
tinguishing security or semantic security. To facilitate the
interpretation of our results and to allow a fair comparison
with other schemes, we cite a recent result from [2], which
shows equivalence between the two approaches. By this, our
definition of security against a dishonest user is equivalent
to semantic security. We also extend the notion of semantic
security such that it handles joint message distributions, which
results in a definition matching distribution independent secu-
rity. We will give the definitions for Bob’s security, the security
for Calvin is completely symmetric.
The notion of semantic security captures the intuition that
an adversary should not learn anything useful about the
message. In other words, the probability that the adversary
can compute a function f of the message should not increase
significantly after observing the protocol compared to the a
priori probability of a correct guess. The semantic security
advantage is defined as
Adv
ss = max
f,PW1 ,σ
{
max
A
Pr {A(Y n2 , S
n,ΘC , σ) = f(W1)}
−max
S
Pr {S(PW1 , f) = f(W1)}
}
,
where f is any function ofW1, A is any function the adversary
may compute after observing the protocol and S is a simulator
trying to compute f without accessing the protocol output.
Here also,W2 is uniformly distributed and independent ofW1.
The term simulator to denote guessing functions comes from
the intuition that ideally there exists an algorithm (simulator)
that simulates the run of a protocol without having access to
the message and whose output is indistinguishable from the
output of a real protocol. Theorems 1, 5 and 8 from [2] prove
the following inequalities:
Adv
ss ≤
√
2 ·Advmis; Advmis ≤ 4 ·Advss log
(
2n
Adv
ss
)
This result shows that requirement (4) is naturally equivalent
to semantic security. i.e., a small ǫ in (4) implies that Advss
is also small.
The above discussion assumed that Calvin cannot choose
the distribution of his own message W2. We now extend the
above definition of semantic security such that it does not rely
on the distribution of W2, which results a stronger notion of
security. We define the adversarial advantage for this case as
Adv
ss
dis =
max
f,PW1,W2 ,σ
{
max
A
Pr {A(Y n2 , S
n,ΘC , σ,W2) = f(W1,W2)}
− max
S
Pr {S(PW1,W2 , f,W2) = f(W1,W2)}
}
. (10)
Note that here we allow the simulator to have access to the
message W2 which an honest Calvin will learn. We show
the following lemma which implies that requirement (7) is
equivalent to this extended notion of semantic security. Due
to space constraints we give the proof in the extended version
of this paper [13].
Lemma 1.
Adv
ss
dis ≤
√
2 ·Advmisdiss
Adv
mis
dis ≤ 4 ·Adv
ss
diss log
(
2n
Adv
ss
diss
)
.
This lemma suggests that our results on mutual informa-
tion security (see Theorems 1-2 in the next section) also a
characterize the rate region for semantic security.
III. MAIN RESULT
Theorem 1. The secret message capacity region as defined in
Definition 2 is the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ which
satisfy the following two inequalities:
R1(1− δ2)
δ2(1− δ1)(1 − δ1δ2)
+
R1
1− δ1
+
R2
1− δ1δ2
≤ L log q, (11)
R2(1− δ1)
δ1(1− δ2)(1 − δ1δ2)
+
R1
1− δ1δ2
+
R2
1− δ2
≤ L log q. (12)
We prove Theorem 1 in two steps. First, we provide a
protocol in Section IV and show that this protocol achieves
all the rate pairs in the capacity region. We then apply the
converse proof developed for the weaker honest-but-curious
security definition to get an upper bound. The two regions
match, i.e., a dishonest user cannot deteriorate the performance
experienced by an honest user. The first term of (11) and (12)
can be interpreted as the overhead for security, because – as we
will see soon – it corresponds to the duration of a secret key
generation phase. Omitting these terms gives us the capacity
region for the message transmission problem with two users
without any secrecy requirements [4].
In the case of distribution independent security we do not
have a complete characterization: we construct a scheme that
satisfies this stronger security definition, however its optimality
is not clear. The next theorem gives the rate region achieved
by our scheme.
Theorem 2. If a rate pair (R1, R2) satisfies
R1(1− δ2)
δ2(1− δ1)(1− δ1δ2)
+
R2(1− δ1)
δ1(1− δ2)(1− δ1δ2)
+
R1
1− δ1
+
R2
1− δ1δ2
≤ L log q, (13)
R1(1− δ2)
δ2(1− δ1)(1− δ1δ2)
+
R2(1− δ1)
δ1(1− δ2)(1− δ1δ2)
+
R1
1− δ1δ2
+
R2
1− δ2
≤ L log q. (14)
then (R1, R2) ∈ Rdis.
IV. PROTOCOL FOR DISHONEST RECEIVERS
We describe an (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme that is secure against
a dishonest user as defined in Definition 2. In our new scheme
we bring together ideas that secure message transmission in
the presence of an adversary and ideas that allow efficient
transmissions for multiple parties.
Main steps: We apply a two-phase approach intro-
duced first in [12]. Alice attempts to send N1 mes-
sage packets W1 = (W1,1,W1,2, . . . ,W1,N1) to Bob and
W2 = (W2,1,W2,2, . . . ,W2,N2) to Calvin using at most n
packet transmissions.
I. Key generation. Alice sends uniform i.i.d. random pack-
ets over the channel. From the acknowedged packets,
secret key packets between Alice-Bob and between
Alice-Calvin are set up such that Bob’s key is secret
from Calvin and Calvin’s key is secret from Bob. Privacy
amplification [14], [15] is used to ensure security of the
keys.
II. Message encryption and transmission. Alice encrypts the
messages using the key packets and reliably transmits
them to the two receivers. The encryption operation is a
simple XOR with the encryption key packets, however
the encryption key packets are not independent. Instead,
they are produced from the secret key packets using a
maximum distance separable (MDS) code. This allows
efficient usage of the keys [12].
In both phases we rely on channel properties and exploit that
neither receiver receives all transmitted packets. This allows
both efficient key generation and efficient (in terms of key size)
encryption. Previous work [12] has shown that it is sufficient
to know the expected behavior of the channel, there is no need
to know exactly which packets are received by an adversary.
To illustrate, consider the key generation phase. Assume
that Alice transmits three random (independent and uniformly
distributed) packets X1, X2, X3, and assume Bob receives
X1, X2, while Calvin receives X2, X3. If we could rely on
Bob and Calvin’s honesty, we could then assign KB = X1
as a secret key between Alice and Bob, while KC = X3
as the key between Alice and Calvin. If we cannot rely on
Bob and Calvin’s honesty, but we do know that Bob and
Calvin have received at most one packet in common, we could
allocate KB = X1 ⊕X2 as the key between Alice-Bob, and
KC = X2 ⊕X3 as the Alice-Calvin key.
Note that although similar techniques are used in [1], [12],
none of these previous schemes can handle an adversary who
– being a legitimate receiver – has some control over the
protocol run and who can also actively deviate from the
protocol. To summarize, our new scheme has the following
distinguishing features:
1) In the key generation phase the set of packets we use to
compute the keys for Bob and for Calvin are not disjunct, still
keys are secure.
2) Although Calvin can influence the run of the protocol, we
ensure that independently of his acknowledging strategy, he
cannot control how many times a given encrypted packet with
Bob’s message appears on the channel. From this property it
follows that we can estimate accurately the number of packets
Calvin overhears which makes it possible to use an encryption
similar to [12].
3) In the second phase we need coding to make transmissions
maximally useful for both users as seen in [4]. Alice can
send an XOR-ed packet only if both receivers have a side
information packet. However, a dishonest user might deny
having a side information packet and hinder these coded
transmissions. In our scheme we apply a round robin type
scheduling to ensure that dishonest feedback cannot diminish
the rate experienced by the other user.
A. Protocol description
Parameters: The operation of the protocol utilizes a set of
parameters which we can directly calculate before the protocol
starts, and whose use will be described in the following.
kB = N1
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2
+
(
N1
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
, (15)
kC = N2
1− δ1
1− δ1δ2
+
(
N2
1− δ1
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
. (16)
k1 =
kB
δ2
+
1
δ2
(
2kB
δ2
)3/4
, k2 =
kC
δ1
+
1
δ1
(
2kC
δ1
)3/4
.
n1 = max
(
k1
1− δ1
+
(
k1
1− δ1
)3/4
,
k2
1− δ2
+
(
k2
1− δ2
)3/4)
(17)
n′2 =
N1
1− δ1
+
N2
1− δ1δ2
+
(
N1
1− δ1
+
N1
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
(18)
n′′2 =
N2
1− δ2
+
N1
1− δ1δ2
+
(
N2
1− δ2
+
N2
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
(19)
n = n1 +max{n
′
2, n
′′
2}. (20)
Key Generation
1) Alice transmits n1 packets X1, . . . , Xn1 . She generates
these packets uniformly at random from FLq using her private
randomness, and independently of W1, W2.
2) Bob and Calvin acknowledge which packets they have
received. If Bob receives less than k1 packets we declare a
protocol error for him. Similarly for Calvin if he receives less
than k2 packets. When an error is declared for both users, the
protocol terminates. If not, we continue with the user not in
error, as if the user in error did not exist.
3) Let XB1 be a L × k1 matrix that has as columns the first
k1 packets that Bob acknowledged. Alice and Bob create
kB secret key packets as KB = X
B
1 GKB , where GKB
is a (k1 × kB) matrix and is a parity check matrix of a
(k1, k1− kB) MDS code. Similarly, using the first k2 packets
that Calvin acknowledges, Alice and Calvin create kC secret
key packets using the matrix GKC . Matrices GKB , GKC are
publicly known and fixed in advance.
Message encryption and transmission
Encryption
4) Alice and Bob produce N1 linear combinations of their
kB secret key packets as K
′
B = KBGK′B , where GK′B is a
(kB × N1) matrix and is a generator matrix of an (N1, kB)
MDS code which is also publicly known. Similarly, Alice and
Calvin create N2 linear combinations of their kC key packets.
5) Alice creates N1 encrypted messages to send to Bob
UB,i = W1,i ⊕K
′
B,i, i = 1 . . .N1
where ⊕ is addition in the FLq vector space. Let UB denote
the set of UB,i, i = 1, . . . , N1. She similarly produces a set
UC of N2 encrypted messages to send to Calvin.
Encrypted transmissions
6) Alice sequentially takes the first encrypted packet from
UB,i, i = 1 . . .N1, that is not yet acknowledged by Bob
and repeatedly transmits it, until there is one that only Calvin
acknowledges. That is, if at time i Alice transmits Xi = UB,j
for some j < N1, then
Xi+1 =
{
Xi, if S
∗
i = ∅
UB,j+1, if S
∗
i ∈ {B,BC}.
(21)
Let QB denote the last transmitted packet of this step, i.e., the
first such packet that only Calvin acknowledges. If there is no
such packet, QB is empty.
7) Similarly, Alice sends the first not-yet-acknowledged (by
Calvin) encrypted packet from UC,i, i = 1 . . . N2, until there
is one that only Bob acknowledges. If at time i Alice transmits
Xi = UC,j for some j < N2, then
Xi+1 =
{
Xi, if S
∗
i = ∅
UC,j+1, if S
∗
i ∈ {C,BC}.
(22)
Let QC denote the first such packet that only Bob acknowl-
edges. If there is no such packet, QC is empty.
8) Alice transmits the sum of the two undelivered packets:
QB ⊕ QC . If QB or QC is empty, then Alice sends the
non-empty packet. If both QB and QC are empty, then both
messages W1 and W2 are successfully delivered and we stop.
If at time i Alice sends Xi, then

if S∗i = ∅, then Xi+1 = Xi
if S∗i = B, then repeat steps 6 and 8.
if S∗i = C, then repeat steps 7 and 8.
if S∗i = BC, then repeat steps 6, 7 and 8.
(23)
If at any point, the overall number of transmissions would
exceed n as defined in (20) we stop and declare an error for the
party (or parties) who has not acknowledged all his encrypted
message packets.
B. Protocol analysis
We prove that the presented scheme is secure against a
dishonest user as defined in Definition 2 and runs without
error with high probability. We use lemmas whose proofs
are provided in [13]. A simple calculation with the given
parameters shows that it achieves any rate pair in the the region
defined by (11)-(12).
1) Security: In our argument we focus on the secrecy of
W1 against a dishonest Calvin, but the same reasoning works
for W2 against a dishonest Bob as well.
To analyze the secrecy of W1, we may, without loss of
generality, assume that no error was declared for Bob during
the key generation phase. Recall that an error is declared for
Bob only if Bob fails to acknowledge at least k1 packets. If
an error was in fact declared for Bob, no information about
Bob’s messageW1 is ever transmitted by Alice. However, note
that we do account for this error event when we analyze the
probability of error for Bob (Section IV-B2).
We first show that I(KB;Y
n1
2 S
n1) can be made small,
i.e., the key generation phase is secure.
Lemma 2. When Bob is honest and no error is declared for
Bob in the key generation phase,
I(KB;Y
n1
2 S
n1) ≤ kBe
−c1
√
k1L log q, (24)
if k1 =
kB
δ2
+ 1δ2
(
2kB
δ2
)3/4
and kB ≥
2
δ2
, where c1 > 0
is a constant. Further, KB is uniformly distributed over its
alphabet.
The key facts we use in proving this lemma are (i) the
number of packets seen by Calvin concentrates around its
mean and (ii) an MDS parity check matrix can be used to
perform privacy amplification in the packet erasure setting.
We still need to show that the secrecy condition is satisfied
by the scheme even if Calvin chooses any message distribution
PW1 and applies any acknowledging strategy, i.e., (4) holds.
In the proof we omit taking the maximum, but the argument
holds for any message distribution and any adversarial strategy,
so the statement follows. We have
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘC) ≤ I(W1;Y
n
2 |Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC), (25)
where the inequality used the fact that ΘA,ΘC ,W2, S
n are
independent of W1 and we may express Y
n1
2 , UC as deter-
ministic functions of ΘA,ΘC ,W2, S
n. LetMCB be the random
variable which denotes the number of distinct packets of UB
that Calvin observes either in its pure form or in a form where
the UB,i packet is added with some UC,j packet. We have the
following two lemmas:
Lemma 3. H(Y n2 |Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC) ≤ E
{
MCB
}
L log q.
Lemma 4.
H(Y n2 |W1Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC) ≥ E
{
min
(
kB,M
C
B
)}
L log q
− I(KB;Y
n1
2 S
n1)
Using these in (25), we have
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘC) ≤ E
{
max
(
0,MCB − kB
)}
L log q (26)
+ I(KB;Y
n1
2 S
n1). (27)
Lemma 2 gives a bound for the second term. We can bound
the first term using concentration inequalities. Notice that
the probability that Calvin overhears a packet UB,i (where
we count overhearing in both pure form or as part of a
linear combination), is 1−δ2
1−δ1δ2 independently of Calvin’s ac-
knowledging strategy. Thus, MCB is a sum of N1 independent
random variables, and hence E
{
MCB
}
= N1
1−δ2
1−δ1δ2 . Since
kB = N1
1−δ2
1−δ1δ2 +
(
N1
1−δ2
1−δ1δ2
)3/4
, by applying Chernoff-
Hoeffding bound we have
E
{
max
(
0,MCB − kB
)}
≤ N1 Pr
{
MCB > kB
}
≤ N1e
−c2
√
N1 ,
for a constant c2 > 0. Substituting this together with Lemma 2
in (27) we get
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘC) ≤ N1e
−c2
√
N1 + kBe
−c2
√
kB ,
for constants c1, c2 > 0. By choosing a large enough value of
N1, we may meet (4).
2) Error probability: An error happens if (a) Bob receives
less than k1 packets in the first phase, or (b) he does not
receive N1 encrypted message packets in steps 6 and 8 before
the protocol terminates. Both these error events have the same
nature. An error happens if Bob collects significantly fewer
packets than he is expected to receive in a particular step.
We apply Chernoff-Hoeffding bound as we did to show the
security guarantee proving that the probability of these events
can be made arbitrarily small. We omit details to avoid parallel
arguments.
3) Optimality: We can assume that both Bob and Calvin
are honest and apply the converse proof developed in [1]
(Theorem 4 in [1]). Obviously, this is a valid upper bound
in the case of a dishonest user as well. With this we prove
optimality and complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. Any achievable rate pair (R1, R2) ∈ R as
defined in Definition 2 satisfies inequalities (11) and (12).
V. DISTRIBUTION INDEPENDENT SCHEME
In the following we describe a scheme which satisfies
the stronger security notion as defined in Definition 3. The
protocol of Section IV cannot satisfy distribution independent
security, because if Calvin knows his message a priori, then
UC carries information about the packets used in the key
generation phase, hence potentially giving him extra infor-
mation about Bob’s key. We can overcome this issue if we
modify the key generation phase and make sure that no packet
used in generating Calvin’s key contributes to Bob’s key,
thus UC is conditionally independent of Bob’s key given
Calvin’s observation of the protocol and W2. This results in
two separate key generation phases, one for Bob and one for
Calvin.
Instead of sending n1 key generation packets as defined in
(17), we have a key generation of length n∗1 + n
∗
2, where
n∗1 =
k1
1− δ1
+
(
k1
1− δ1
)3/4
; n∗2 =
k2
1− δ2
+
(
k2
1− δ2
)3/4
.
Bob’s key is then computed from the first n∗1 packets, while
Calvin’s key is computed from the next n∗2 packets. All other
parameters remain the same as in Section IV and the second
phase remains unchanged too.
This scheme provides distribution independent security,
which property is proved formally in [13]. A straightforward
rate calculation completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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